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Abstract 
We investigate breaks in financial spillovers between the US and eight South-East Asian 
capital markets before and during the 1997 Asian crisis. We construct threshold vector 
autoregressive models and apply novel techniques to test whether causality patterns between 
markets are characterized by one or two regimes. Linkages between the US and Asian markets 
are shown to follow the threshold model with two regimes, turmoil and tranquility, pointing to 
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differences in cross-border return spillovers in stable and crisis periods. The causality analysis 
shows that spillovers between US and Asian markets become stronger in the turmoil regime.  
JEL Classification: C12, C32, G15 
Keywords: International financial spillovers, threshold VAR models, financial contagion.  
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1. Introduction 
Cross-border spillovers occupy an important place in international finance literature. 
Interdependencies between capital markets play a significant role for asset pricing and cost of 
capital calculation, and determine the gains and risks of international portfolio diversification. 
Macroeconomic policy makers and investors are not only concerned about the existence of the 
inter-market linkages but even more about sudden breaks in these linkages, for example the 
breaks caused by currency crises. Such breaks could affect the economy through a change in 
capital flows or in real linkages between markets, such as trade. They may lower 
diversification benefits from international investing and change investors' behavior after the 
break (Ang and Bekaert, 2002, Forbes and Rigobon, 2002, Rigobon, 2003).  
In contrast to the contemporaneous interdependencies between markets, as measured by 
correlation coefficients, focusing on the time structure of spillovers sheds new light on the 
assimilation of shocks and time-varying patterns of cross-country return causality. Measuring 
causality provides insight on the speed of information and capital flows between markets. As 
price-relevant information emerges on one market, it not only generates trades in domestic 
assets, but can also be relevant for the valuation of foreign assets, hence inducing trades and 
price movements abroad. However, for information to travel across borders, transmission 
channels must exist. Real economic linkages between countries, financial markets, and 
financial institutions, as well as the existence of common lenders have been established in the 
literature as channels of information flow (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000, Kodres and Pritsker, 
2002, and Pritsker, 2001, among others).  
Empirical studies on the causal relationship between capital markets traditionally focused 
on the return spillovers between mature markets (Chen, Chiang, and So, 2003, Eun and Shim, 
1989, Karolyi, 1995, Malliaris and Urrutia, 1992, Peiró, Quesada, and Uriel, 1998), between 
mature and emerging markets (Hu, Kholdy and Sohrabian, 2000, Masih and Masih, 2001, Ng, 
2000), and across emerging capital markets (Gelos and Sahay, 2001, Scheicher, 2001). The 
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overwhelming evidence is that, first, US market returns lead both developed and emerging 
markets around the world. Second, these studies also find other highly capitalized stock 
exchanges to exert non-negligible international influence, e.g. the Japanese market leads Asian 
emerging markets. Third, causal relationships between emerging stock markets, albeit weak, 
also exist. Moreover, the bulk of existing studies shows spillovers to be unidirectional, with 
newly emerged capital markets found to be lagging behind their mature counterparts, and being 
themselves not a source of spillovers to the developed markets.  
However, the assumption of inter-temporal stability and the unidirectional character of 
financial spillovers, common in previous studies, can be considered inappropriate in the 
context of return causality. Given the number of financial crises which occurred repeatedly in 
the past decade around the world, one would expect causation patterns to differ between calm 
and crisis periods. Changes in the patterns of causality may take the form of temporal 
strengthening or weakening of spillovers, or even as a reversal in causality between markets. 
Increases in the contemporaneous linkages during financial crises have already been reported 
in the empirical literature, e.g. in the US in the context of the 1987 crisis, and during the Asian 
crisis of 1997 (Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng, 2005, King and Wadhawani, 1990, Rigobon, 2003).  
Furthermore, the relative importance of spillover channels is argued to be time-varying, 
with some channels being more active in crisis periods. According to Pritsker (2001), channels 
between financial markets can exist due to 1) real economic linkages, 2) actions of banks 
operating internationally, and 3) financial market effects. The latter can be driven by common 
macroeconomic news (King and Wadhwani, 1990), cross-border portfolio rebalancing due to 
liquidity shock in one country (Calvo, 1999), to hedging of macroeconomic risks (Kodres and 
Pritsker, 2002), or to wealth changes induced by changing stock prices (Kyle and Xiong, 
2001). A wide use of trading strategies such as feedback trading, herding, and application of 
risk management rules (Schinasi and Smith, 2000), mostly by portfolio investors like mutual 
funds (Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler, 2001), will magnify these cross-border spillovers. 
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Theoretical arguments and empirical evidence suggest that the channels discussed above allow 
initially domestic shocks to spill across borders, inducing reactions of markets abroad. Hence, 
a change in the interdependence between markets arises. This establishes an economic 
rationale for the hypothesis investigated in this study that spillover patterns differ across 
regimes. 
In this paper, we extend the existing literature by analyzing changes in spillover patterns 
between the US market and emerging stock markets in South-East Asia in the period when the 
latter markets undergo a financial crisis. Specifically, we focus on the severe financial crisis of 
1997 that could have reversed spillover patterns between markets, e.g. due to contagion effects. 
We expect, first, shifts in cross-border causality patterns, and, second, stronger causation 
effects from the Asian markets to the US market in a crisis regime and much weaker effects in 
a stable one, due to the notion that specific shock transmission channels are more active during 
crises. The regime-change hypothesis is often discussed in empirical literature supposing 
South-East Asia as the source of the 1997 crisis (e.g. Climent and Meneu, 2003, Forbes and 
Rigobon, 2002, Kaminsky and Schmukler, 1999, Rigobon, 2003, Sander and Kleimeier, 2003). 
We employ a novel methodology in the context of financial spillovers, namely threshold vector 
autoregressive (TVAR) models, with estimation and testing procedures developed by Tsay 
(1998) and Hansen and Seo (2002). Being in general more flexible and avoiding the 
construction of arbitrary spillover structures and mechanisms, this approach overcomes the 
severe shortcomings of the previous studies. We discuss this issue in more detail in the next 
section. Moreover, using the tests for Granger-causality, we explicitly investigate whether the 
direction and strength of spillovers change significantly as markets move from one regime to 
another. 
We find strong evidence in favor of breaks in causality patterns across regimes, with the 
US market being a significant source of causality in both regimes. Spillovers from Asia to the 
US are observable almost exclusively in the crisis regimes, i.e. following large (negative) 
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return or volatility shocks. These findings are generally in line with results reported by Chen, 
Chiang, and So (2003), Climent and Meneu (2003), Rigobon (2003), and others using different 
data samples and methodologies. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a description of 
the methodology applied, Section 3 presents data and discusses empirical results as well as 
their interpretation, and Section 4 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Modeling Financial Spillovers 
Few approaches have been proposed to model changes in the cross-border return 
spillovers resulting from switching between tranquil and turbulent regimes. Previous literature 
uses models with shifts being captured by dummy variables or by arbitrary sample splitting. 
These studies document significant increases in spillovers during crisis periods (Climent and 
Meneu, 2003, Malliaris and Urrutia, 1992, Theodossiou, Kahya, Koutmos, and Christofi, 
1997). More recently, Chen, Chian, and So (2003) model regime changes within the double-
threshold autoregressive GARCH model. The advantage of this method is that the crisis 
window is not set arbitrarily on the basis of ex-post information, which would give rise to 
possible data mining (Billio and Pelizzon, 2003), but is estimated from the data. The 
disadvantage is that one cannot identify where the crisis originates since both countries change 
regimes simultaneously.  
 The methodology employed in this paper, threshold VAR models, overcomes several 
shortcomings common in the empirical literature. First, it does not impose any arbitrary 
relationship between daily index returns, but allow them to depend on lagged values of the 
second market returns as well as on autoregressive terms, hence capturing the inter-temporal 
dynamic structure of spillovers. Our framework allows all variables representing stock index 
returns on the markets to be explained by the model. In this way we avoid the estimation bias 
resulting from overlooking the bi-directional spillovers between the US and Asian markets 
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(Billio and Pelizzon, 2003, Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). Second, we estimate regime changes 
endogenously and explicitly test for the difference between parameter values in two regimes. 
We utilize approaches of Tsay (1998) and Hansen and Seo (2002) to compute sample estimates 
and test statistics as they offer an easy-to-handle treatment to this problem, in contrast to the 
method of Chen, Chian, and So (2003) consisting of several steps and lacking the simplicity of 
asymptotic solution. 
We first construct the models of financial spillovers between the US market and an 
emerging East Asian market. Next, we describe the technique to estimate the models and to test 
for differences in spillovers between markets in calm and crisis regimes.  
 
2.1 Threshold VAR Model 
We assume that stock index returns on the emerging market, tx , depend on their past 
history and on lagged returns from the US market, ty . We also allow for feedback spillovers 
from the Asian to the US market because omitting the bilateral dependencies has been argued 
to bias the results on spillovers between financial markets (Billio and Pelizzon, 2003, Forbes 
and Rigobon, 2002).  
Under the null hypothesis, the patterns of linkages between the markets are assumed to 
be constant across regimes. Hence, the vector autoregressive process generating returns in both 
countries is given by: 
 ∑
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0 ε ,       (1) 
where ][ ′≡ ttt yxz , 0A  is a vector of constant terms, kA  is the matrix of coefficients 
corresponding to lagged stock index returns ktz − , and tε  is the vector of unobserved 
innovations on both markets.  
 Under the alternative hypothesis, the model is the threshold vector autoregression that 
accounts for possible shifts in causation patterns between the markets due to regime changes: 
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where )(⋅I  is an indicator function equal to one if its argument is logically true and zero 
otherwise. kA  and kB  are the coefficient matrices in the two different regimes of tranquility 
and crisis, respectively, and 0A  and 0B are the corresponding vectors of constant terms. dtw −  is 
the threshold variable, lagged by d  periods. It is interpreted as a crisis indicator, which 
determines the current regime of the model. The stock index returns in tz  are generated by the 
linear vector autoregressive processes ∑
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on whether the variable dtw −  is above or below the threshold value q , respectively.  
 
2.2 Estimation Procedure  
 An important step in the analysis is the estimation of both VAR models. We apply the 
algorithm proposed by Hansen and Seo (2002) to estimate parameters of the threshold VAR 
model. In the matrix notation the linear VAR model (1) can be formulated as: 
 ttt AXz ε+= ,          (3) 
where ]  ...   [ 10 kAAAA ≡  and ] )( ... )(  1 [ 1 ′′′≡ −− kttt zzX . For the two-regime model, let A  denote 
the matrix of the first-regime coefficients and ]  ...   [ 10 kBBBB ≡  denote the matrix of the 
second-regime coefficients. Now the threshold VAR model (2) takes the form: 
 ttt qCXz ε+= )( ,         (4) 
where ]    [ BAC ≡ , ]  )()(    )()(  [)( ′≤′>′≡
−−
qwIXqwIXqX dttdttt . When the parameters d  and 
q  are known, model (4) becomes linear in relation to the parameters in C , and A  and B can be 
estimated using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. 
Hansen and Seo (2002) propose a quasi-Maximum Likelihood (ML) procedure to 
estimate parameters of the threshold VAR model, when d  and q  are unknown (see also 
Hansen, 2000). Since the likelihood function is not smooth in the threshold model (4), these 
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authors use a grid search to find estimates of d  and q , where }  ..., , 1 { md ∈ , with m  being the 
lag length in model (4), and Gq ∈ . G  is the set of all observation values of dtw −  in the sample, 
constrained by deleting 10% of the highest and 10% of the lowest observation values, as 
suggested by Andrews (1993) and Hansen and Seo (2002). For each combination of d  and q  
(denoted as dˆ  and qˆ ) selected from the grid, the OLS estimates of A  and B , namely Aˆ  and 
Bˆ , are computed. The estimates { dˆ , qˆ , Aˆ , Bˆ } from the combination that maximizes the 
concentrated log-likelihood function: 
 nqdnqdL −Σ−= ),(ˆlog
2
),(         (5) 
are the ML estimators. ),(ˆ qdΣ  is the estimate of the covariance matrix of tε  in model (4) and 
n  is the number of observations. 
 
2.3 Statistical Tests 
 Our econometric approach to investigate the stability of spillovers between capital 
markets during financial crises relies on two testing procedures for the threshold VAR models. 
Under the null hypothesis, 0H , the process generating tz  is well described by the linear VAR 
model (1). Alternatively, the hypothesis 1H  states that the correct specification is a more 
general threshold VAR model (2). 0H  is nested in 1H , because the threshold model (2) 
satisfying constraint BA =  becomes the linear model (1). 
If the value of the threshold parameter q  were known, one could use the conventional 
likelihood ratio ( LR ), Lagrange multiplier ( LM ), or Wald (W ) statistics to test the hypothesis 
0H : BA = . However, the parameter q  is in general not known and it is not identified under 
the null hypothesis. In this case the statistics LR , LM , and W  do not have their asymptotic 
standard chi-square distributions under 0H  and their true distributions have yet to be derived. 
Hansen and Seo (2002) consider the SupLM statistic, as in Davies (1987): 
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)(  sup qLMSupLM
qmaxqqmin ≤≤
= ,        (6) 
where )(qLM  is the Lagrange multiplier statistic conditional on the value of q , computed for 
the estimated models (1) and (2). qmin  and qmax  are the lowest and the highest values in the 
set G , respectively. To calculate a valid first-order approximation of the asymptotic null 
distribution of SupLM , Hansen and Seo employ the fixed-regressor bootstrap technique, 
similarly to Hansen (1996, 2000). They define the new vector of dependent variables ttt uz ε~* ≡ , 
where tε~  are residuals from the estimated model (1) and the values of tu  are drawn randomly 
from the N(0,1) distribution.  
The statistic *SupLM  is calculated from the estimates of the models (1) and (2), where *tz  
instead of tz  is set as the vector of dependent variables. The computations of *SupLM  are 
repeated many times using different draws of tu  from the N(0,1) distribution. Then, the 
percentage of the calculated *SupLM  statistics exceeding SupLM  approximates the asymptotic 
p -value of the SupLM  statistic under the null hypothesis. In our investigation we derive the 
SupLM  and *SupLM  statistics using formula (6) from the )(qLM  statistic that is adjusted for 
possible heteroscedasticity of residuals, as explained in detail by Hansen and Seo (2002): 
 )ˆˆ())()(()ˆˆ()( 121 BAvecqVqVBAvecqLM ′−′+′′−′= − ,     (7) 
where 
 
1
11211
1
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1
22222
1
2222 )]()()][()([)]()([)( −− ′⊗′′⊗= qXqXIqqqXqXIqV ξξ ,   (9) 
and 2I  is the identity matrix of order two, ⊗  denotes the Kronecker product, )(1 qX  and )(2 qX  
are the matrices of stacked rows )( qwIX dtt >−  and )( qwIX dtt ≤− , respectively. )(1 qξ  and )(2 qξ  
are the matrices of stacked rows )]([~ qwIX dttt >⊗ −ε  and )]([~ qwIX dttt ≤⊗ −ε , respectively. 
 Tsay (1998) proposes an alternative test for the hypothesis BAH =:0 , which is based 
on predictive residuals and the recursive least squares method. Consider the set 
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},...,{ 1* dnd wwG −−=  of all n  observations of the threshold variable dtw −  in the sample. Let )(iw  
be the i -th smallest element of *G  and )(it  denote the time index of )(iw . Arrange the 
observations in the VAR model (1) in the increasing order of the threshold variable dtw − : 
 ditditdit AXz +++ += )()()( ε , ni ,...,1= .      (10) 
Let lAˆ  be the estimate of A  in the model (10) based on the first l  observations from the 
arranged sample, where nl < . The predictive residual dlt ++ )1(εˆ  and the standardized predictive 
residual dlt ++ )1(ηˆ  are then defined as: 
 dltmdltdlt XAz ++++++ −= )1()1()1( ˆεˆ ,        (11) 
 
5.0
)1()1()1()1( )]()(1[ˆˆ dltmdltdltdlt XVX ++++++++ ′+= εη ,     (12) 
where 11 )()( ]))(([ −= ++∑ ′= li ditditl XXV . Consider the standardized predictive residuals in the 
regression: 
 dltdltdlt X ++++++ +Ψ= )1()1()1(ˆ υη ,        (13) 
where 1 ...,  ,0 −= nll  and 0l  is the starting point of the recursive least squares estimation. The 
appropriate statistic proposed by Tsay (1998) for testing the null hypothesis that the model is 
linear can be formulated as: 
]ln)][ln12([)( 100 SSmlndC −+−−= ,      (14) 
where: 
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and dlt ++ )1(υˆ  are the least squares residuals of regression (13). This statistic has an asymptotic 
chi-square distribution with )12(2 +m  degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis. 
 We use both tests instead of choosing one for several reasons. First, Tsay's testing 
statistic has a standard asymptotic chi-square distribution in contrast to the test of Hansen and 
Seo, where the distribution of the SupLM  statistic needs to be approximated using a bootstrap 
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technique. However, the latter test is robust against heteroscedasticity of disturbances, which is 
important when analyzing financial data. Second, Tsay's statistic is a test of a linear VAR 
model against a more general nonlinear alternative model, e.g. a Markov switching VAR 
model, a smooth transition VAR model, or our threshold model. Hansen and Seo provide the 
statistic that is designed to test directly for the existence of the threshold effect in the VAR 
model and has higher power in comparison to the test of Tsay (Hansen and Seo, 2002). 
 
3. Data and Empirical Results 
 In our empirical investigation, we analyze the stability of financial spillovers in tranquil 
and turmoil regimes by modeling the dependency between the US market and eight emerging 
capital markets in South-East Asia before and during the Asian crisis of 1997. The turbulent 
period in Asia started with devaluation and a stock market plunge in Thailand in July 1997. It 
was followed by Malaysian an Indonesian market declines in July and August, respectively, 
and the Hong Kong crash in mid-October. Subsequently, the Korean market experienced a 
downslide starting in mid-December and ending in January 1998. Between mid-August 1997 
and mid-January 1998, the majority of Asian stock market indices declined by more than 30 
percent, with Hong Kong losing almost 48 percent. The crisis spread to other markets in the 
region and worldwide.  
The sample consists of daily observations of stock index returns from the US market 
(S&P 500), Hong Kong (HSI), Indonesia (JCI), Malaysia (KLSI), Philippines (PSE), Singapore 
(STI), South Korea (KOSPI), Thailand (SET), and Taiwan (TWII). These Asian markets 
suffered most from the financial crisis (Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini, 1999). In order to avoid 
the possible influence of other international crises (Mexico in 1994 and Russia in 1998), our 
sample covers the period from June 1, 1995 to May 31, 1998.1  
                                                 
1
 Data for the Philippines is only available from November 15, 1996. 
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We start our investigation by testing for the presence of cointegration (long-run 
relationship) between stock indices on different markets. If the US stock index were 
cointegrated with an index from an Asian market, we would have to include an appropriate 
error correction term in model (2). However, using tests of Engle and Granger (1987) and 
Johansen (1991, 1995), we find no reliable evidence of bi-variate cointegration between the US 
index and any investigated Asian stock index. Therefore, we use stationary VAR and TVAR 
models in our study.2 
Employing the data for national stock indices, we model dependencies between the 
markets and allow for shifts in spillovers during turmoil periods. We test for the existence of 
those shifts using the tests described in Section 2. To capture the sluggish adjustment of stock 
returns to news as well as the day-of-the-week effect, we employ five lags in model (2), i.e. 
m=5. Next, we analyze the causality patterns between the markets by conducting Granger-
causality tests.  
 An important part of the analysis is the choice of the threshold variable, which depends 
on the definition of the calm and crisis regimes. Crisis regimes are usually characterized by low 
returns and high volatility. This definition of the crisis regime is a controversial issue in the 
literature, with some authors arguing that asset returns are superior crisis indicators, e.g. Chen, 
Chian, and So (2003), Mishkin and White (2003), and others highlighting the importance of 
changes in volatility between regimes, e.g. Ang and Bekaert (2002), Fong (2003), Rigobon 
(2003), and Sola, Spagnolo, and Spagnolo (2002). Therefore, we estimate various threshold 
vector autoregressive models which employ lagged stock index returns or lagged squared 
returns from the US and respective Asian market as crisis indicator variables. Then, we choose 
those threshold variables that maximize the respective likelihood functions. 3 
                                                 
2
 Toda and Phillips (1994) describe tests of causality in the presence of cointegration. 
3
 Since the number of observations and parameters does not change for different threshold 
variables, the maximum likelihood criterion is equivalent to Akaike and Schwarz criteria. 
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The results presented in Table 1 show that the stock index returns or variance from the 
US market are superior crisis indicators in seven out of eight models. These optimal threshold 
variables are used in the further analysis. The fact that the US variables best indicate regime 
change during the turbulent period in Asia can be explained by the fact that the US market, 
characterized by higher capitalization and trading volume, is more informationally efficient 
than its Asian counterparts. Consequently, it incorporates information concerning the latter 
quicker than it is being done on each of the Asian markets. Hence, the US variables might 
predict the switch to a turbulent regime for the US-Asian relationship, even if this is the Asian 
market that becomes the source of spillovers in a crisis regime. For instance, when crisis hits 
an Asian market, then returns on this market drop significantly but investors still absorb 
information from the US market and the regime does not yet change. However, when investors 
in the US notice the crisis, they react with extreme (low) returns and then start to follow 
information (and returns) from said Asian market. Thus, extreme returns on the US market 
become direct indicators of regime change. 
Moreover, the change in spillover patterns might be induced by a change in trading 
strategy by US-based portfolio investors, implementing a new strategy first on the home (US) 
market and subsequently abroad. Also, it is possible that Asian investors react to a change in 
investment strategy by US investors with a similar change on their home markets, as they 
interpret the behavior of US investors as a reaction to unobservable shocks influencing both 
US and Asian markets. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Furthermore, we perform the tests of Hansen and Seo (2002) and Tsay (1998) to 
investigate possible breaks in financial spillovers between markets. The results are presented in 
Table 2. The results of Tsay’s tests are generally in favor of the regime-switching hypothesis. 
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This can be seen in Table 2 where seven out of eight Tsay statistics reject the linear VAR 
model at the 5% level of significance, in favor of the regime-switching hypothesis. However, 
as noted in Section 2, this test approach can suffer from several weaknesses. Therefore, to 
obtain additional and more reliable evidence, we further conduct a test by Hansen and Seo 
which is robust to heteroscedastic errors and has higher power. As in the previous case, Hansen 
and Seo’s test clearly indicates that the null hypothesis of inter-temporal stability in cross-
border causation patterns between returns can be rejected at high significance levels, as 
indicated by high values of the test statistics. This shows that all spillover models are non-
linear.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
This finding suggests that spillover patterns change between crisis and tranquil regimes 
in the majority of linkages investigated. Only the outcome for Taiwan (TWII) is mixed, but at 
least one test rejects the null hypothesis of stability in the spillover patterns. The estimated 
threshold parameters indicate that markets enter the crisis regime after the returns on the 
selected (generally US) market fall below some negative threshold value (e.g. -0.8036 for the 
pair US-Hong Kong (HSI)), or the return volatility, estimated by squared returns, increases 
beyond some high threshold value, e.g. 1.4971 for the pair US-Thailand (SET). These high 
absolute values of threshold variables suggest that crisis regimes are infrequent in the sample, 
since it is hard for the respective market to surpass the threshold. Indeed, only exceptionally 
low returns or highly volatile returns on one of the markets lead into a crisis regime. This fact 
is mirrored by both the high percentage of observations in the calm regime, as well as the short 
duration of crisis regimes in comparison to turbulent ones. More specifically, in all but one 
(two) models, over 69 (85) percent of observations are in a calm regime (Table 2). 
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Furthermore, the estimated average length of a crisis regime is usually shorter than two 
days while tranquil regimes last on average more than seven days for all but two models. A 
distinctive exception is the relationship between Philippines (PSE) and the US, where a more 
volatile regime dominates in the sample. Generally, the results on the frequency of regime 
changes and the duration of regimes indicate that regime changes are not of the structural break 
type. Markets are characterized by multiple and random swings into crisis and rapid jumps 
back to a calm regime rather than by a single regime change and long regime duration.  
In order to investigate the changes in causality patterns, we conduct tests of Granger-
causality for the relationship between the US and Asian markets for each market and regime 
separately. From the results displayed in Table 2, it is reasonable to assume that two regimes 
are present and that threshold parameters are estimated precisely in each analyzed relationship. 
Therefore, we can employ the Wald statistics which are robust toward a general form of 
heteroscedasticity to test whether lagged returns from one market provide important 
information for modeling current returns on the other market. As a robustness check, we also 
employ the standard F and the likelihood ratio (LR) tests in models where autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) is explicitly accounted for.4 In order to control for 
ARCH effects in residuals, we estimate GARCH, EGARCH, and TARCH models of 
Bollerslev (1986), Nelson (1991), and Glosten, Jagannathan, Runkle (1993) and Zakoian 
(1994), respectively, as suggested by Cheung and Fujii (2001). We select the optimal models 
using the Schwarz information criterion. Results from Granger-causality analysis are presented 
in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 about here 
                                                 
4
 The adjustment for the ARCH effects is justified by the presence of conditional 
heteroscedasticity in residuals in model (2) – results not reported here. As Cheung and Fujii 
(2001) show, F and LR tests lack power if the ARCH effects are not explicitly accounted for. 
We thank the referee for suggesting this methodology. 
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In accordance with the hypothesis presented in the introduction, spillovers between 
capital markets are found to be unstable and to change across regimes, as reported in Panel A 
of Table 3. The US market leads six Asian markets in a calm regime (Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand), as indicated by the significant test 
statistics. Moreover, we observe additional causation effects to South Korea and Taiwan in a 
crisis regime. However, the difference between causality from the US market in crisis and calm 
regimes is modest. The results obtained by Chen, Chian, and So (2003), Climent and Meneu 
(2003), and Malliaris and Urrutia (1992) also suggest stronger spillovers from the US market to 
other markets in turmoil periods. Last, the shocks originating on the US market are found to 
spill over to the Asian markets in all but one (KOSPI) case, regardless of the regime. 
The weak causality for the pair US-Korea deserves additional attention. We believe that 
this effect is due to the regulations of Korean market, specifically to restrictions on capital 
flows, asset ownership, as well as governmental interference with the security pricing process, 
which weakened Korean linkages with the world market (also found e.g. by Baig and Goldfajn, 
1999, Climent and Meneu, 2003, and Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000). The special position of 
industrial agglomerates, cheabols, probably also contributed to this outcome. 5  
We now proceed with the novel finding emerging from the results presented in Table 3, 
Panel A. As expected, past returns on the Asian markets are of little importance for the current 
development of US index returns in a tranquil regime. Only limited causality from Asian 
markets to the US market is found in the sample. However, in a crisis regime the causation 
effects from Asian markets to the US market are stronger and statistically significant in five out 
of eight cases. This result suggests that information from less developed markets is transmitted 
to the US market, albeit mostly in turbulent periods. These periods are relatively short, as 
                                                 
5
 For the chronology of economic and political events in Korea and other countries, see an 
excellent database by Geert Bekaert and Campbell R. Harvey: http://www-
1.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/gbekaert/other.html 
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presented in Table 2, which in turn explains the lack of causation from emerging markets to the 
US market detected in some earlier studies (e.g, Chau-Lau and Ivaschenko, 2003, Hu, Kholdy, 
and Sohrabian, 2000, Masih and Masih, 2001).  
To highlight the importance of our finding of regime-dependent causality between 
markets, we also estimate linear VAR models and present the results in Panel B of Table 3. As 
can be seen, the VAR methodology is unable to differentiate between regimes. As a result, the 
hypothesis of causality running from Asia to the US is rejected in all but one case. This is in 
contrast to the results from the TVAR analysis as presented in Panel A, where significant 
spillovers from Asian markets to the US market are detected in a crisis regime. This outcome 
can be explained by the short duration of the turbulent regime, and constitutes a justification of 
the employment of the threshold VAR models that allow for regime changes. 
In general, our results from the threshold models suggest that there is evidence of 
significant spillovers from Asian markets to the US market during the Asian crisis in 1997. In 
contrast to the results from linear VAR models, the two-regime threshold VAR models are able 
to detect significant spillovers from Asian markets at least in one regime in seven out of eight 
cases. Moreover, both regimes are significant in all cases, which suggests that linear models 
describing dependencies between markets during the Asian crisis may be misspecified. 
If a turmoil regime is primarily characterized by the “contagious” financial crisis in 
South-East Asia, then our results provide important insight into the direction and speed of 
spillovers from the crisis region to the US market. This finding well fits two definitions of 
financial contagion widely used in the literature. First, financial spillovers from one market to 
another can be defined as contagion, as in Claessens, Dornbusch, and Park (2001) and Pritsker 
(2001), among others. We find evidence in favor of such spillovers from the US to Asia and in 
the opposite direction during crisis regimes. Second, contagion can be understood as a break in 
the interdependency structure between countries, a definition introduced by King and 
Wadhwani (1990) and favored by e.g. Edwards (2000) and Rigobon (2003), among others. In 
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the paper, we find a significant difference in spillover patterns between regimes. Hence, our 
results support both definitions of financial contagion as presented above. Obviously, some 
information transmission mechanisms are at work mainly during turbulent periods, e.g. actions 
of bank lenders (Allen and Gale, 2000; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000) or hedge and mutual 
funds (Schinasi and Smith, 2000, Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler, 2001) responding to 
macroeconomic, liquidity, or wealth shocks, as discussed in the introduction. This induces 
changes in spillover patterns between markets. 
The economic rationale for spillovers between US and Asian markets might be discussed 
in the framework of Pritsker’s (2001) contagion channels. First, in the presence of real 
economic linkages, be it via trade or foreign direct investment, values of companies in one 
country will react to changes in comparative advantages of companies in the other country 
induced by changes in interest rates, currency value, taxes and other contributions, property 
rights protection, etc. Second, involvement of US banks in Asia might establish a channel for 
spillovers. For instance, in case of shocks deteriorating the profitability of their Asian 
customers, US banks will at the beginning suffer directly from unpaid and delayed loans and 
then will try to maintain their liquidity by tightening their credit policy (e.g. reducing credit 
provision) at home. Third, portfolio rebalancing by US investors as a response to 
macroeconomic, liquidity, or wealth shocks, will exert impact on stock prices in many 
countries, an effect magnified by asymmetric information by feedback trading, herding, and 
use of certain risk techniques by portfolio investors worldwide. In sum, there are several 
channels through which Asian markets can influence the US one, and vice versa, especially 
following a shock originating in one country and spilling abroad in turbulent periods. 
 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
Earlier studies in international finance assumed the stability of cross-border causation 
patterns or focused on breaks in instantaneous interdependencies between financial markets 
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without analyzing the direction of information flows during turmoil periods. In this paper, we 
extend the existing literature by employing a novel methodology to answer the questions of 
causation stability as well as the nature and directions of spillovers between US and Asian 
stock markets. 
The results from our analysis suggest that causal relationships between the US and eight 
Asian markets are not stable and change significantly across regimes. Returns and squared 
returns from the US market are usually better crisis indicator variables, and dominate as 
optimal threshold variables. Capital markets seldom enter a crisis regime and leave it after only 
one or two days. Spillovers from the US market to Asia exist in both regimes and become more 
intensive in turmoil. On the other hand, causation from Asian capital markets is decent in a 
calm regime but strong in a crisis regime. These results are in accordance with the literature 
finding some transmission channels to be more active during crisis than tranquil regimes, a 
result of changing behavior of bank lenders and portfolio investors. These breaks in spillover 
patterns may be interpreted as evidence of financial contagion.  
From an economic perspective, we learned that the US market was influenced by Asian 
markets performance when these emerging markets were hit by financial crisis. All other times, 
information from the emerging markets played a minor role in the behavior of US stock index 
returns. On the other hand, the US market is an important determinant of Asian stock returns in 
both regimes. 
International investors can use the knowledge regarding the driving forces behind 
changes in causality patterns for more accurate return forecasting rather than rebalancing their 
portfolios. This is due to the short duration of the crisis regimes found by applying the 
methodology of Hansen and Seo (2002). For instance, the policy of reallocating capital during 
a two-day turmoil period would imply high portfolio turnover and, hence, extraordinary costs 
of asset management. Similarly, from the policymakers’ perspective, the regime changes were 
too frequent and crisis periods too short to adjust policy each time they emerge. Short-term 
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changes in macroeconomic policy would be costly, ineffective, and increase market 
uncertainty. Nevertheless, the results presented in this paper show that modeling spillovers in a 
double regime framework provides an approach for better understanding and forecasting 
information and capital flows between capital markets during crisis periods.  
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Table 1: Log-likelihood values in the threshold models 
 
Threshold 
variable dtw −  
HSI KOSPI TWII STI SET JCI KLCI PSE 
1−tx  -903.76* -1099.35 -904.77* -736.85* -1035.59 -994.45 -1036.04 -525.00 
2−tx  -918.33 -1119.49 -930.55 -767.69 -1026.93 -1008.52 -1025.15* -539.98 
3−tx  -926.35 -1113.76 -928.93 -765.88 -1040.27 -1010.12 -1045.17 -536.50 
4−tx  -922.40 -1118.85 -926.88 -760.48 -1025.61 -1009.65 -1037.53 -520.94 
5−tx  -934.17 -1104.28 -937.57 -742.91 -1022.56 -1027.88 -1050.98 -517.14* 
1−ty  -911.99 -1125.07 -923.60 -768.09 -1026.04 -1022.31 -1036.89 -536.24 
2−ty  -929.06 -1104.07 -934.65 -752.85 -1029.54 -1007.72 -1049.33 -535.61 
3−ty  -924.48 -1107.98 -921.37 -750.57 -1030.08 -1015.21 -1040.24 -538.54 
4−ty  -905.38 -1117.50 -934.51 -759.67 -1050.24 -994.13* -1046.05 -539.38 
5−ty  -928.87 -1112.38 -937.24 -758.26 -1029.94 -1024.55 -1048.21 -541.49 
2
1−tx  -913.79 -1121.03 -940.66 -764.26 -1042.14 -1017.18 -1037.89 -527.75 
2
2−tx  -938.57 -1110.03 -939.12 -742.72 -1028.92 -1013.75 -1051.27 -541.51 
2
3−tx  -954.81 -1118.95 -931.13 -774.64 -1040.51 -1022.58 -1050.29 -541.03 
2
4−tx  -908.83 -1124.14 -939.57 -768.42 -1020.74* -1013.94 -1048.39 -528.51 
2
5−tx  -938.21 -1093.39* -937.52 -764.91 -1044.43 -1016.54 -1044.74 -525.10 
2
1−ty  -922.59 -1106.08 -931.11 -781.79 -1025.75 -1018.10 -1047.77 -546.85 
2
2−ty  -917.96 -1114.42 -921.78 -757.50 -1028.22 -1013.05 -1051.56 -536.99 
2
3−ty  -912.24 -1117.17 -935.22 -745.19 -1035.59 -996.58 -1046.54 -542.90 
2
4−ty  -914.92 -1106.01 -934.20 -752.06 -1044.72 -1025.48 -1040.58 -531.62 
2
5−ty  -939.04 -1123.77 -937.39 -746.59 -1023.80 -1017.85 -1052.36 -546.20 
Note: The highest log-likelihood values are marked with *. ktx −  denotes stock index returns on the US market at time kt −  and kty −  denotes stock 
index returns on the respective Asian market at time kt − . 
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Table 2: Tests for stability of financial spillovers 
 HSI KOSPI TWII STI SET JCI KLCI PSE 
Statistic of Tsay 40.2116* (0.010) 
61.8050** 
(0.000) 
16.1517 
(0.808) 
60.9487** 
(0.000) 
36.4349* 
(0.027) 
44.1894** 
(0.003) 
35.7576* 
(0.032) 
25.2134 
(0. 287) 
Statistic of 
Hansen and Seo 
37.6420** 
(0.000) 
29.7121** 
(0.000) 
27.1726** 
(0.002) 
31.4391** 
(0.002) 
33.4605** 
(0.001) 
36.3683** 
(0.001) 
44.2809** 
(0.000) 
30.3096** 
(0.000) 
Estimated 
threshold 
parameter 
-0.8036 1.4168 -0.8036 -.8006 1.4971 -1.1901 -0.2582 1.2033 
Threshold 
variable 1−tx  
2
5−tx  1−tx  1−tx  
2
4−tx  4−ty  2−tx  5−tx  
Percentage of 
observations in 
the calm regime 
89.17 86.02 89.14 89.18 86.02 85.14 69.82 11.51 
Average duration 
of the crisis 
regime [in days] 
1.25 1.23 1.22 1.21 1.27 1.48 1.56 8.97 
Average duration 
of the calm 
regime [in days] 
10.17 7.52 9.89 9.85 7.81 8.38 3.61 1.16 
Note: *, ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. P-values are presented in parentheses. For both tests, the 0H  hypothesis is 
that there is no difference in the causality patterns across regimes, against 1H  of structural break in causality patterns due to regime change. ktx −  
denotes stock index returns on the US market at time kt −  and kty −  denotes stock index returns on the respective Asian market at time kt − . 
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Table 3: Tests for Granger-causality between markets 
y
 Null hypothesis 
 HSI KOSPI TWII STI SET JCI KLCI PSE 
Panel A: Results from the TVAR models 
S&P 500 does not cause  
y in crisis regime 
W 
F 
LR 
53.013*** 
16.517*** 
32.867*** 
6.018 
2.103* 
4.997 
16.315*** 
2.637** 
6.439 
19.491*** 
2.249** 
13.319** 
10.229* 
1.863* 
7.023 
38.642*** 
10.896*** 
37.421*** 
26.570*** 
0.000  
4.581 
24.510*** 
3.016** 
28.367*** 
S&P 500 does not cause  
y in calm regime 
W 
F 
LR 
44.052*** 
19.880*** 
99.122*** 
5.974 
0.378 
7.964 
5.501 
1.583 
3.972 
19.138*** 
5.706*** 
33.385*** 
12.534** 
2.652** 
16.046*** 
18.131*** 
2.209* 
26.909*** 
12.089** 
1.706 
19.296*** 
23.851*** 
3.263*** 
10.546* 
S&P 500 does not cause  
y in any regime  
W 
F 
LR 
97.066*** 
16.921*** 
122.603*** 
11.992 
1.237 
12.784 
21.816** 
2.007** 
9.851 
38.629*** 
3.902*** 
44.326*** 
22.763** 
2.090** 
21.880** 
56.773*** 
6.584*** 
66.819*** 
38.659*** 
0.841 
23.076** 
48.361*** 
3.140*** 
39.546*** 
y does not cause  
S&P 500 in crisis regime 
W 
F 
LR 
35.170*** 
11.538*** 
46.029*** 
7.805 
5.096*** 
32.217*** 
10.632* 
7.119*** 
27.948*** 
18.181*** 
4.636*** 
17.419*** 
11.214** 
2.803** 
8.593 
7.228 
0.272 
4.034 
6.667 
0.000 
2.197 
2.771 
0.237 
3.028 
y does not cause  
S&P 500 in calm regime 
W 
F 
LR 
9.173 
1.783 
11.300** 
7.397 
0.154 
7.596 
4.672 
0.502 
2.587 
2.480 
0.436 
2.631 
5.161 
0.612 
3.826 
6.708 
1.134 
11.413** 
2.162 
1.229 
7.627 
8.784 
7.501*** 
25.182*** 
y does not cause  
S&P 500 in any regime 
W 
F 
LR 
44.343*** 
6.737*** 
53.538*** 
15.202 
2.487*** 
40.492*** 
15.304 
3.792*** 
30.021*** 
20.661** 
2.533*** 
19.865** 
16.375* 
1.716* 
12.299 
13.936 
0.764 
14.917 
8.829 
0.348 
9.698 
11.555 
3.733*** 
29.706*** 
 
Panel B: Results from the VAR models 
S&P 500 does not cause y 
in any regime 
W 
F 
LR 
58.074*** 
33.161*** 
166.269*** 
6.885 
0.877 
5.375 
22.482*** 
6.134*** 
20.305*** 
29.607*** 
12.189*** 
58.698*** 
12.111** 
2.771** 
17.538*** 
29.678*** 
8.204*** 
49.991*** 
11.941** 
3.467*** 
33.333*** 
22.251*** 
4.113*** 
29.664*** 
y does not cause  
S&P 500 in any regime 
W 
F 
LR 
14.681** 
8.847*** 
21.323*** 
3.521 
0.000 
7.480 
3.260 
0.776 
3.422 
4.848 
1.168 
4.158 
8.932 
1.871* 
6.968 
13.936 
1.226 
8.069 
4.300 
0.894 
6.550 
0.851 
0.000 
1.545 
Note: W is the heteroscedasticity-adjusted Wald statistic, F and LR are the ARCH-adjusted F and likelihood ratio statistics, respectively. P-values 
are presented in parentheses. *,**, and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. It is 
possible that some values of the F statistic in ARCH models are negative – in this case we enter 0.000 in the table. 
